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ADDRESS
CONTROLLING FIREARMS*
JOHN KAPLAN"
T O THE CHEERS OF THE ASSEMBLED DELEGATES, Dr. William S. Thayer, while
serving as President of the American Medical Association, warned of the
presence of tyranny in any legislation covering what we may or may not eat or
drink.1 Certainly, he could not have been referring to the Pure Food and Drug
Act, which has been vigorously supported by the medical establishment.
However, this meeting was convened in July of 1929, and the reference was to
the legislation which created Prohibition. The denunciation of Prohibition,
though simple on its face, was the result of weighing a large number of facts
about alcohol, the way people use it, and the enforcement of the laws against
it. Since he probably believed the facts to be completely different with respect
to other drugs, such as opiates or marijuana, he would have reached entirely
different conclusions about them.
One may ask why I am beginning a lecture entitled "Controlling Firearms"
with analogies between drugs and alcohol. The reason is simple: I propose to
draw an analogy between drugs and firearms. Part of the reason for this is that
I have worked in the drug area for over a decade while my interest in guns is
much more recent. In addition, the similarities in the way we discourse about
drug control and about firearms control are striking. Finally, and most
important, the issues with which we grapple in the drug control area may, on
examination, turn out to be very similar to those that would concern us if we
were to make a serious effort at controlling firearms.
Sociologists have often ascribed our drug control problems to the fact that
the legislature has attempted to make criminal private conduct engaged in by
very sizable numbers of people who value that conduct. A legislature is
moved in part by its views of social damage wrought by drug use, in part by a
desire to stigmatize those who use drugs, and in part by its views of proper
moral behavior. The problem, moreover, seems to be compounded when
significant portions of those who engage in the conduct have rationalizations
for their behavior, and, hence, for their violations of the law, which outweigh
their tendencies to be law-abiding. The effort to prevent drug use is extremely
expensive both in material and human terms. This effort may nonetheless be
ineffective in preventing massive violation.
Consequently, designing the appropriate legal treatment for a drug is a
sensitive task. Careful judgments about the type of regulation for any
substance must be balanced against the social cost. The problems
encountered in balancing the costs and benefits of various kinds of drug
regulation may be instructive in examining the problem of "gun control."
*This address was delivered by Professor Kaplan as the Fourteenth Cleveland-Marshall Fund
Visiting Scholar Lecture on April 10, 1979, at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law of the
Cleveland State University.
** Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B., LL.B., Harvard Univ.
N.Y. Times, July 9, 1929, at 1, col. 7.
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The computation of the social damage caused by the use of an illegal drug
is an extremely complicated one, since many of the costs attributed to a drug's
use can be traced in great part to its use under conditions of illegality.2 Thus,
both the heroin overdose and the marijuana arrest - two of the most serious
consequences of the use of those respective drugs - turn out to be caused by
the prohibition as well as the use of the drug.
Despite their exaggeration by the public, some social costs, entirely apart
from those created by our system of legal regulations, occur due to the use of
the illegal drugs. None of the drugs is completely safe, even though the law
clearly makes street heroin much less safe than it would be if it were dispensed
legally by pharmacists,3 and marijuana seems to be well within the limits of
safety we permit for our legal but also potentially dangerous drugs, alcohol
and tobacco. 4 Despite this, no one has argued that every user of legal mari-
juana or of legal heroin under all conditions would emerge unscathed from
the experience or, more precisely, from the repeated experience. At the very
least, either drug, if overused, can interfere with scholastic achievement or
job performance,5 and it certainly seems that the chronic smoking 6 or intra-
venous injection of any substance increases the likelihood of various health
complications.
To ascertain the social costs of drug use, we must look at our most abused
drug - alcohol. Since it is freely and legally available, we can examine the
effects of its use, uncontaminated by either the costs or the public health
benefits of illegality. The social cost of alcohol use is so staggering and obvious
that we need not even attempt to compute it here.7 Nor can we argue that
there is some inherent difference between alcohol and the illegal drugs which,
for the most part, we will compare to guns. In fact, an accurate estimate of
the costs of an activity, uncontaminated by the costs of its prohibition, is best
obtained when the activity is legal.
The legality of alcohol is simply an artifact of time. Fifty years ago, it was
prohibited. In ten more years, marijuana, which is now prohibited, may be
legal as well. Both alcohol and marijuana, and, we might add, heroin and
cocaine, were and are drugs; they have all been both legally available and
criminalized in the United States at different times in this century; their use,
even legally, will impose costs upon society; and, as the cases of alcohol8 and
another legal drug, tobacco, 9 show, the public health risks and other costs of
drug use can be enormous, entirely apart from the costs imposed by the
system of legal regulation.
Indeed, it is beside the point whether, with respect to a given drug, these
J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA - THE NEw PROHIBITION (1975) [hereinafter cited as J. KAPLAN,
MARIJUANA]. See also E. BREcHER, Licrr AND ILLIcrr Dnucs (1972); A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND
THE LAw (1965); Kaplan, A Primer on Heroin, 27 STAN. L. REV. 801 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Kaplan, Heroin].
3 See Kaplan, Heroin, supra note 2, at 820-21.
J . KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, ch. 4.
5 Id. at 61, 62-63, 84, 192-94, 273.
6 PUB. HEALTH SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1979) [hereinafter cited as SMOKING].
7 See, e.g., PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 3 D SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH (1978) [hereinafter cited as ALCOHOL].
8 Id.
9 SMOKING, supra note 6.
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costs would be greater or less under a different legal treatment. One can argue
persuasively that the overall costs of marijuana use plus the enforcement of
marijuana laws could be lessened by licensing the drug and making it more or
less freely available.10 We accepted a similar argument with respect to alcohol
when we repealed Prohibition - and most of us would probably not
repudiate that decision. For our purposes here, however, the important point
is that the existence of each of these substances and of people who wish to use
them imposes costs on society which differ with the method of legal
regulation but which can be substantial no matter what kind of regulation we
adopt.
Moving now from drugs to guns, we see that since guns are legal for the
most part, the costs of their regulation today add relatively little to the present
social costs of their possession. And despite a considerable amount of
statistical naivete in many computations, which tends to exaggerate the
benefits of doing away with various classes of guns," there is little doubt that
the possession of these weapons imposes significant costs upon society. 2 In
some ways, the calculation here is easier than with respect to the drugs, since
the more sudden and dramatic consequences of gun use allow us to keep a
more accurate count. Indeed, quite a horrendous picture may be painted -
and often is - of the consequences of civilian gun ownership.
The rate of firearm-caused homicide in the United States is vastly in excess
of the corresponding rate in any other developed Western nation. By way of
example, the United States rate was 6.6 firearm-caused homicides per 100,000
persons in 1974. It was 5.6 in 1971 and 4.5 in 1968.13 In contrast, Australia's rate
of .6 per 100,000 ranks among the highest firearm-caused homicide rates
among the other developed Western nations." Moreover, the problem is
increasing, not decreasing. During the decade from 1964 to 1974, the
homicide rate doubled in the United States, and the percentage of homicides
caused by firearms rose from fifty-five to sixty-eight percent. 5
This same high incidence of gun use is found in connection with other
violent crimes, such as robbery and aggravated assault. For instance, in 1974,
one-fourth of the almost one-half million reported aggravated assaults
involved the use of a gun.'6 Of the almost one-half million reported robberies
in 1974, about forty-five percent involved the use of a gun.17 And, in 1974,
robberies resulted in about fifteen percent of our homicides, the bulk of which
were caused by firearms. 8
The costs of gun ownership can be broken down and classified in various
ways. For our purposes here, it will prove helpful to distinguish between two
10 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 332-52.
1, See, e.g., NAT'L SHOOTINc SPORTS FOUNDATION, INC., FI ARmsS PROHIBITION; see also R.
KUKLA, GUN CONTROL (1973).
12 See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, MEMORANDUM ON THE PROBLEM OF THE
CRIMINAL USE OF HANDGUNS (1975) [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDUM].
13 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1964, 1971, 1974 [hereinafter cited
as F.B.I.].
,4 NAT'L COUNCIL TO CONTRaOL HANDGUNS, THE CASE TO CONT'RoL HANDGUNS (1978).
'S F.B.I. 1974, supra note 13, at 7; F.B.I. 1964, supra note 13, at 3.
II F.B.I. 1974, supra note 13, at 20.
17 Id. at 24, 26.
18 Id. at 18.
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kinds of costs. First are costs wrought by gun owners who acquire the
weapons with no thoughts of illegality or animus toward anyone. These guns,
nonetheless, take a sizable toll on the gun owners, their relatives and their
friends. Often this is the result of negligent storage, as where a child plays with
the gun he has found, but more often someone in the heat of passion seizes and
uses the readily available lethal weapon. As it turns out, the great majority of
gun homicides - about 10,000 - falls into this category. 19 Typically, only one
shot is fired, but it is about five times more likely to kill than the knife used by
one who has no gun available.20
The second category of costs of gun ownership consists of the gun crimes
of those who plan their crimes in advance, often acquiring the gun for that
very purpose. The great majority of gun robberies and their associated
homicides - about 6,000 - fall into this second category. 21 Various efforts to
lower the costs of gun use will have very different consequences with respect
to these two kinds of costs.
Of course, any discussion of the respective costs of drug and gun use must
inevitably reach what appears to be a major asymmetry between them. Drug
use harms primarily the user, while the major harms arising from gun
ownership are the injuries and deaths of innocent people. The analysis does
not end here, however. First of all, though the major damage done by drug use
is to the user himself, this is not the only type of damage caused by drugs.
The matter is clearest with respect to the two drugs which, like most firearms,
are presently legal - alcohol22 and tobacco. 23 The former causes the deaths of
thousands of innocent people (in addition to the deaths of the- "guilty"
drinkers themselves) in both automobile and industrial accidents. And, in
fact, alcohol is implicated in just about as many criminal homicides as are
guns. 24
Also, although cigarette smoking is generally regarded as a classic example
of drug use which harms only the user, a high percentage of fires arises as a
result of cigarette smoking. Throughout the nation, about three times as many
people are killed accidentally in fires as by firearms.25 In short, the use of our
two legal drugs doubtlessly causes the injury and death of more "innocent"
people than does private gun ownership.
Moreover, even the illegal drugs represent some danger to the innocent.
The use of amphetamines, barbiturates, and cocaine, like alcohol, is impli-
cated in violent assaults. 26 And, though no one has made any effort to cal-
culate the number who die as a result of someone else's use of marijuana,
such deaths probably occur. After all, the available evidence indicates that the
driver under the influence of marijuana is at least somewhat impaired - if not
19 Id. at 19.
20 G. NEWTON & F. E. ZIMBINC, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 41 (1970).
21 F.B.I. 1974, supra note 13, at 18.
22 See ALCOHOL, supra note 7.
2 See SMOKINC, supra note 6.
24 See ALCOHOL, supra note 7, at 85.
25 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 779, 787 (32d ed. 1978).
21 Ellinwood, Amphetamine and Stimulant Drugs, in Dauc USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN
PERSPECTIVE 140 (1973) (Appendix to the Technical Papers of the Second Report of the National
Comuission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse).
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in comparison with the drunk driver, at least in comparison with the driver
free from the influence of any drug at all.27
More important, however, is the fact that we simply cannot ignore the
harm to the willing user. Indeed, though we regard harm to others from an
activity as more important, we often do prohibit activities which on the
surface seem only to harm the willing victim. We justify this because those
users who are harmed are of an age where they must be protected by the laws;
because indirect injuries are inflicted on non-users who are deprived of
support; because the overall productivity of society is lessened; because
people who injure themselves cast a burden on the rest of society so long as we
provide welfare and medical care; and, finally, because, at least to some
extent, we are our brothers' keepers. 21
Indeed, one can argue that dividing the dead and the injured into innocent
victims and guilty users is unduly punitive and moralistic. Not everyone shot
by a gun is morally innocent in the altercation, and we often regard a
dependent drug-user as faultless due to his condition. Also, with respect to
both guns and drugs, the harm visited on the guilty is often so far out of
proportion to their culpability that the distinction between the guilty and the
innocent seems irrelevant.
No society concerns itself solely with harm to others while completely
ignoring the injuries caused by self-harming conduct. Rather, we seem to be
concerned primarily with two things: first, the total amount of social harm,
with perhaps some weighting in favor of preventing harm to innocent non-
users; and, second, efforts at enforcement of laws against consensual, self-
harming conduct which usually raise serious practical problems and them-
selves impose major costs upon society. 29
Although it is not very important whether the overall social costs of
recreational drugs or of guns is greater, we should note that it would be hard to
devise a weighting of harms which would not make the drugs far more costly
in social terms than the firearms. Indeed, either the seventy percent excess
mortality ratio of cigarette smokers compared to non-smokers 30 or the $55
billion estimated cost of alcoholism 3' would seem, by itself, to dwarf the total
cost of gun ownership.
It is not only the calculable cost of an activity that moves one to support its
criminalization. As has been pointed out on various occasions, the law has a
symbolic function as well. Those who wish an activity criminalized may be
relatively indifferent to its actual costs or the costs of its criminalization;
instead they may wish the law to make a statement about the kind of society
this is and about the unworthiness of those people who engage in the behavior
of which they disapprove.
Though the classic study of this phenomenon has focused on Prohibition,3 2
21 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 62-63.
2' Kaplan, The Role of the Law on Drug Control, 1971 DuKE L. J. 1065. See also Feinberg,
Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIAN J. PHILOSOPm 105 (1971).
29 H. PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 267 (1968).
30 SMOKINC, supra note 6, at 1-10.
31 ALCOHOL, supra note 7, at 16.
32 J. GUSFiELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE
MOVEMENT (1963).
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one can also discern a strong element of symbolism in both the literature
advocating drug prohibition and that supporting gun "control." Entirely apart
from the efficacy and costs of the laws in question, many advocates of drug
prohibition desire a formal statement from the law-making bodies declaring
that ours is a drug-free society and one that does not enjoy artificially induced
or unearned pleasures.3 Similarly, others value the ideal of a gun-free society
- one that abhors violence and, hence, the means of deadly force.
Another strain often found in both the anti-drug and anti-gun literature is
that the law should stigmatize the attitudes, values, and kinds of people who
are associated with the particular behavior. An official governmental
declaration that some kinds of people are less worthy than others may be an
important symbol of their own righteousness to a significant percentage of the
population.34 Thus, those who do not use drugs perpetuate the large number
of myths as to why others do: users are dope-fiends, radicals, or long-haired
hippies; users are lazy, dirty, self-indulgent, interested only in their own
pleasure, and unwilling to face this world.35 Similarly, many people who do
not own guns stigmatize gun owners as "gun nuts;" they are red-necks, violent,
anti-intellectual, racist, reactionary and dangerous.38
It is not particularly important at this point, but it is nonetheless interesting
to note that the drug users and the gun users are among those most likely to
hold the stereotypical views of each other, though there are, of course, many
people who hold such views of both groups. It seems that, as a first
approximation, the drug user and the gun user lie at opposite ends of a
continuum of political viewpoints, lifestyles, and values, with perhaps one-
fifth of the population lying on the gun end and perhaps somewhat fewer on
the drug end.37 Thus, the drug user - or at least the marijuana user - tends to
be liberal, urban, young, and if educated, leaning toward the arts and
humanities.38 The gun owner tends to be conservative, rural, older, and if
educated, more involved in engineering and the sciences.3 9 Moreover, it
seems that the greatest opposition to each side's position tends to come from
the other, although between the two groups lies perhaps half the population
which approves of neither and regards both as imposing serious costs upon
society.
Related to the support of drug or gun control laws because of the
symbolism they involve is the support such laws receive on moral grounds.
Many people simply believe that, regardless of any utilitarian calculus, it is
wrong for people to behave in certain ways and that the law should reflect
this. Thus, they believe the drug user and the gun owner to be behaving
33 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, su pra note 2, at 6-7.
34 See J. Q. WILSON, THINKING ABoUT CRIME (1975).
3- J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 6, 7, 17, 58, 60, 69, 152.
36 R. KUKLA, supra note 11.
7 As to guns, see M. HINIJELANG, C. DUNN, L. P. SUTrrON & A. AUMICK, SOURCEROOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1975 (1976) (hereinafter cited as HINDELANG]. As to drugs, see
Abelson, Cohen, Shrayer & Rappeport, Drug Experience, Attitudes and Related Behavior
Among Adolescents and Adults, in 1 DRU USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, 489 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Abelson].
3 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 25, 30, 41, 153; see also Abelson, supra note 37.
39 MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 15-16.
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immorally in pursuing their own selfish interests. They conclude that the law
should make a moral statement against the particular behavior, whatever the
cost.4 0
Regardless of whether the law criminalizing the activity is supported on
pragmatic grounds because of the damage done by the activity or because of
symbolic or moral reasons, the problem of enforcing the law remains. Drug
use or sale, under the typical prohibition, is a consensual (sometimes called
non-victim) crime; the violation typically takes place in private and no one
reports the matter to the police. As a result the police must not only discover
the criminal, they must also discover the crime. Hence the laws are typically
extremely difficult to enforce.
A wide variety of policies has been suggested to lower the social cost of
guns in our society, probably the most drastic of which is gun prohibition.
Certainly, if everyone obeyed the law, the only cost to society would be the
foregone benefits of gun ownership - a matter which many would regard as
negligible anyway. The problem, of course, is that not everyone would obey.
In a sense, the most important lesson we have learned from attempting to
enforce our drug laws is that criminalizing an activity does not in iteslf stop
people from doing it. The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug
Abuse estimates that twenty-two million people use marijuana regularly4' and
that many others use illegal amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine or heroin.42
One cannot make with confidence any firm estimate of the number of users
who would violate a law forbidding the possession or acquisition of firearms.
Nonetheless, there are some ominous signs. First of all, there are a great many
gun owners. Approximately forty-three percent of American families possess
at least one gun; about one in five has a handgun in the house.43 Of course, we
cannot directly compare the numbers of those who violate the laws against
marijuana today with the numbers who engage in what is at present perfectly
legal behavior with respect to guns. The question we must try to answer is
how many would violate a gun prohibition if it existed. To do this, we will
have to ask, among other things, how strongly those who practice a given
behavior actually want to do so.
For instance, so far as marijuana is concerned, a major reason for the
percentage of use is that users simply want to continue use. At the risk of
caricature, one can sketch the many reasons they give for liking their drug use:
they enjoy the feeling of being "high" or of being relaxed; they think of
themselves as especially creative, original and interesting people and get a
satisfaction out of looking down on the square world; and they relish talking
learnedly about the advantages of one drug over another and feeling the
fellowship of a group with similar interests.44
The gun owners, too, have a variety of reasons for owning guns. Often
owners enjoy the use of their guns in hunting or other sports, the feeling of
10 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 290-93.
41 Abelson, supra note 37, at 633.
42 Id.
13 Harris, Support for Gun-Control is Highest in Recent Years, Nashville Banner, Aug. 7,
1978, at 6, col. 2.
41 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 6, 7, 17, 58, 60, 69.
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power that comes of hefting such a lethal device, the feeling of security,
whether or not warranted, that comes from knowledge that one has such a
weapon at hand, the feeling of self-protection, and the symbolic association of
guns with the frontier and with a large portion of the history of America. 45 In
addition, those who like guns often find a certain fascination in the precision
with which they are built.46 The gun, after all, is a remarkable piece of
engineering which can send a small piece of metal at extremely high speeds
with an accuracy that one would regard as phenomenal if he did not know in
advance about the properties of such weapons. Indeed, the gun is comparable
only to the camera in its precision and in the intricacies of its mechanical
engineering. Though there are no data on the issue, one might hypothesize
that the same aspects of personality which may cause one person to be inter-
ested in cameras would cause another to be equally fascinated with guns.
Not only do drug users like drugs and gun users like guns, but at least many
members of each group are prepared to offer rationalizations and
justifications for their behavior in terms of contributing to a better world.
Even if these reasons are not very persuasive to the rest of us, they bolster the
desires of the users with the kind of ideology that makes such behavior more
tenacious than if defended solely in hedonistic terms. Thus, the drug user may
defend his drug use not only on the ground of freedom, with quotations from
John Stuart Mill, but also on the ground that drug use makes one less
competitive, less aggressive, more creative, more sensitive, and altogether
better material with which to build a cooperative, modem, and different
world. 47
Similarly, the gun owner may defend his gun ownership with reference to
the second amendment. He may assert that an armed citizenry is important in
a democracy to protect the freedoms of all from communist coups; to be
ready to engage in guerrilla warfare should the country's armed forces be
overwhelmed by those of a foreign power; or, in the words of one well-known
civil libertarian, simply to make sure that we do not have to "trust the military
and the police with a monopoly on arms and with the power to determine
which civilians have them.."48
It is not necessary to agree with either kind of justification. Indeed, another
parallel between drugs and guns is that a large fraction of the society does not
engage in or value the use of either. 49 That segment simply does not
understand why those who like the activities go to such trouble to engage in
them. As a result, they think less of the drug and gun users.
Entirely apart from the strengths of the justifications used to defend the
illegal behavior, there may well be a distinction between making criminal a
behavior before it occurs and after it is engaged in by large numbers of
people. If this distinction is important, the explosive growth of marijuana
use in the past fifteen years is all the more remarkable. If, as in the case of
marijuana, the behavior were criminalized before it became widespread, it
45 MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 17.
46 Id. at 17 n.30.
17 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 4-6, 10, 19, 315, 323.
41 Kates, Why a Civil Libertarian Opposes Gun Control, 3 Civ. Lm. REv. 24 (1976).
11 See Abelson, supra note 37, at 631; HINDELANG, supra note 37, at 345, 350.
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would be harder for those who then engaged in it to view the law as directed
at them personally. At most, they might feel that a failure to repeal the law was
an effort to stigmatize them.
Where the formerly legal behavior was popular - as was the case in
Prohibition and as would be the case if guns were prohibited - one would
expect the law to meet more resistance. Those who engage in the behavior
may not only have the force of habit to push them toward continuing, but they
also are more likely to see the law as a direct attack upon them. And, having
joined others openly engaging in the behavior while it was legal, they may be
able to count on the support of more-or-less organized groups in disobeying
the law. Indeed, we are often told, as a reason for continuing the prohibition
of marijuana, that Prohibition failed because alcohol was too strongly
ingrained in American culture, the implication being that marijuana, having
far less deep roots, should be easier to extirpate.
If this is so, it may be very important that gun ownership holds a unique
place in American history. This continent was settled after the invention of
firearms, and firearms were necessary not only to the body politic and for the
militia, but also necessary for protection from hostile natives. Perhaps even
more important, guns were used to provide a food supply. 50 In large areas of
the United States gun ownership formed part of a rite of passage where boys
learned to use weapons from their fathers and passed this along to their sons.
Interestingly, the situation was quite different in Europe, which was well
settled before the invention of practical firearms; there were no hostile
natives, gun possession by the ordinary citizen was repressed as a threat to the
classes in power, and hunting, for the most part, was a monopoly of the rich.5'
It is not surprising that they do not have the kind of gun problem that we do
today.
In the case of both marijuana use now and alcohol use during Prohibition,
the desire of large numbers of people to engage in the activity, together with
such factors as ideological justifications, produces violations of the law on a
scale proportional to the ease of evasion. It is possible, of course, that guns
might be different, although passions with respect to the rights of the gun
owner seem to run at least as high as those with respect to the marijuana or the
alcohol user.52
It is possible, of course, that, unlike the marijuana user or the drinker
during Prohibition, the gun owner's respect for law would outweigh his
desires. There are, after all, differences between the drug user and the gun
owner which might make wholesale violation of the law less likely in the latter
than in the former case. After all, the gun user, so far as we can tell, is more
likely to be conservative and devoted to law and order.
Nonetheless, one cannot make too much of this distinction. Many groups
in society denounce the lack of respect for law and order in others but have
rationalizations for their own misbehavior. The same police who deplored
the law violations of draft evaders and anti-war demonstrators have joined in
o MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 15.
51 L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMsmcA: THE ORIGINS OFA NATIONAL DILEMMA 13-
16 (1975).
52 Benenson, A Controlled Look at Gun Controls, 14 N.Y.L.F. 718, 741 (1968).
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illegal strikes, and the very men who orchestrated the American presidential
campaign most devoted to law and order felt little compunction about
obstructing justice themselves.
It is an empirical question in each case whether the desire of an individual
to engage in illegal behavior is outweighed by his adherence to law.
Nonetheless, it is not unlikely that a sizable portion of the gun-owning
population would simply ignore any law interfering with the possession of
weapons, unless the likelihood of apprehension could threaten them into
obedience. Yet, it is likely that any given gun owner would run an extremely
small risk of apprehension; the great majority of them does nothing to attract
police attention. Even if the authorities suspected someone, they would
probably not have the probable cause necessary for a search warrant.
Moreover, if the number of illegal handgun possessors were very large, it
would be impractical to obtain and execute search warrants for any sizable
percentage of their homes.
In fact, it is hard to think of any way we could coerce those gun owners
determined to ignore any prohibition into giving up their weapons, short of
instituting a massive program of house-to-house searches. These are, in fact,
practiced occasionally in other countries - often in the wake of a revolution
- to remove weapons from private hands. Typically, they are buttressed
with summary and extremely high penalties, usually death, for those caught in
violation. On constitutional, practical, political and moral grounds, this would
be inconceivable in America today.
In any event, if the rate of violation of a gun prohibition approached that in
the drug area, we would be faced with a whole series of problems. We will
discuss later the rallying cry, "When guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have
guns." For our purpose here, it is more relevant to state, "When guns are
outlawed, all those who have guns will be outlaws." Laws which turn a high
percentage of the citizenry into criminals impose serious costs on society over
and above those incurred in attempted enforcement."'
Indeed, a major cost of our marijuana laws would then be applicable to
guns:
The marijuana user has been at least partially alienated from our
society by the fact that even though he has not been caught, he has,
nonetheless, been made into a criminal. This by no means follows
simply from the high level of violation of our marijuana laws. A
variety of sociological studies have shown that an important social
norm may very commonly be broken without serious consequences
to the individual or society. For instance, studies of college cheating
have revealed that a very high - indeed, an amazingly high -
percentage of college students has cheated on at least one occasion.
Significantly, however, even those who have cheated tend to regard
the rules against cheating as morally justified; and though they
typically have some rationalization to justify their conduct to
themselves, they consider themselves supporters of the rules against
cheating and are fully prepared to censure those who are caught in
13 See H. PACKER, supra note 29, at 332-42.
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violations. The same is almost certainly true of tax evasion and a
whole series of adult misbehaviors.
The situation is very different, however, with respect to
marijuana. The laws are not only widely violated, but on the basis of
various rationalizations . . . they are not even considered morally
binding by those who have violated them ...
In part because marijuana-users - unlike cheaters - do not
rationlize their use of the drug as an aberrant event unrelated to their
total personality, it becomes especially unhealthy for their society to
declare them serious criminals. It is obvious that when any society
criminalizes such a large percentage of its . . . people, it raises very
serious social problems. We do not know whether those who violate
such serious criminal laws will thereby become more likely to violate
others. It may or may not be true that the second crime comes
easier. . . . It is hard to see, however, how a realization that one has
committed what is officially a very serious crime can fail to engender
at least a somewhat more generalized lack of respect for both the law
and the society that has so defined his action ...
This alienation from both the rule of law and our democratic
society is probably the most serious cost of our marijuana laws.5 4
Moreover, it is likely that if the violation rate is high, attempting to enforce
any law against gun possession will be extremely expensive.55 The drug area,
particularly in the case of marijuana, but also in the case of heroin, has
produced the paradox that the threat of sanctions is not sufficient to deter
users. As a result, violations are so common that they frequently come to
police attention without great police effort. Even though those apprehended
constitute a very small number compared to the total number of violators,
they are numerous enough to constitute a major burden on the criminal justice
system.56 If a similar situation is created with respect to gun owners, their
numbers will raise similar problems, further overtaxing a criminal justice
system already unable to cope with the kinds of violent and predatory crimes
that upset us much more than does the private possession of guns.
Our experience in the drug area should alert us to the consequences of
asking the police to enforce a law which results in violations so numerous that
the police cannot possibly pursue them all. This simply invites selective
enforcement, a problem all too common in American law with respect to
drug and various other "non-victim" offenses. 57 Allowing the police to pick
and choose among a group and to decide whom they will and whom they will
not investigate or arrest for a crime leads to a feeling of unfairness among
those selected for prosecution; to the bribery and corruption of the police; and
to the covert use of all kinds of discriminations - including race, class, and
"appropriate" attitude toward the arresting officer - which we would not
54 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 32-33, 36.
55 MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 25; NAT'L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 11;
F. E. Zimring, There's No Such Thing as a Free Lunch - Gun Control (May 15,1978) (address
given to the Annual Meeting of the Gun Control Federation of Greater Cleveland).
56 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 28-29.
17 PACKER, supra note 29, at 332; J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 41.
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condone if they were overt.5" Since political deviants of the right or the left are
among the most paranoid of Americans, and perhaps least likely to obey a gun
prohibition, we would soon find the police bearing down most heavily upon
them. This should be a matter of considerable concern to those worried about
restrictions on first amendment freedoms.
To be sure, gun owners presumably would not come to the attention of the
police as often as marijuana users, since marijuana use gives off a discernible
odor. Nonetheless, we are familiar with the cast of characters which adds to
the number of arrests in marijuana - the inquisitive baby sitter, the former
lover working off a grudge, and the fireman on the premises to fight a blaze.
All of these would presumably cause gun arrests as well.
Of course, in the case of guns, a death or injury resulting from the use of the
illegal weapon will bring the violation to public attention. In many cases, the
event would demonstrate the wisdom of the gun prohibition. Where the gun
owner commits a murder with his weapon, prosecution on a gun possession
charge might be a superarrogation, but the event itself would serve to
reinforce the educational purposes of the criminalization.59 Similarly, the
lessons of the law would be taught where the now illegal gun goes off
accidentally, though perhaps where a family member is killed, some would
be offended by the prosecution of the bereaved on a gun possession charge.
Enough of the cases coming to the public attention, however, would
involve a householder who fought off a burglar or rapist with an illegal gun.
Though there seems to be no easy analogy here to drug prosecutions, we may
speculate that these cases would cause law enforcement serious problems.
Since the prosecutorial authorities presumably would not regard the
subsequent use of the weapon as negating its initial illegality, they would
probably prosecute the householder. In such cases, however, one would
expect it to be extremely difficult to keep the jury's attention focused upon the
violation of the gun possession law and away from the fact that the case before
them was one where, to put it bluntly, the defendant was right and the law
wrong about his or her need for firearm protection. The likely result of this,
then, would be jury nullification and a refusal to convict.
Not only would convincing a unanimous jury to convict be a difficult and
time-consuming task, thus adding to the expense of enforcing gun
prohibition, but such cases would probably achieve political significance.
Groups working to repeal the prohibition would have every incentive to make
the case a cause c6lbbre in their campaign against the gun law. Since the case
might drag on long after the burglar or rapist had been disposed of, its facts
would be given greatly increased publicity, leaving the public with the
impression that instances of successful self-defense with firearms are far more
common than they actually are.60 This, in turn, would help convince more
people of the need to possess guns for self-defense and would encourage
resistance to the gun law.
58 H. PACKER, supra note 29, at 286-87; J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 695-
99 (1973).
59 P. J. Cook, A Policy Perspective on Handgun Control with Suggestions for Research 5
(Nov. 5, 1976) (unpublished paper; on file with J. Kaplan at Stanford University).
0 See, e.g., NAT'L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUNDATION, INc., supra note 11; P. J. Cook, supra note59,
at 4.
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Of course, we would have to weigh the benefits against the costs of any
prohibition. In the case of our drug prohibitions, the benefits are already
known. Marijuana use is obviously below what it would be if the drug were
freely available; heroin is unavailable to most of the United States' popula-
tion; and the alcoholism rate during Prohibition seems to have been lower
than the present rate. Similarly, it is likely that for its costs, a gun prohibition
would do at least some good. Presumably the number of privately possessed
guns would be reduced, since at least some people would obey the law. 1 As a
result, the number of guns available to cause social harm, either in the heat of
passion or perhaps even when used by robbers, would be lower.
Unforunately, the basic problem with prohibiting any activity is that the
costs of the attempted suppression are proportional to the number of people
who nonetheless continue to engage in the activity, while the benefits of even a
successful prohibition are proportional to the far lower number of violators
who cause social harm. The fact is that the solid majority of the users of either
drugs or guns engage in such activities without causing any social problem at
all. This is true not only of marijuana, where the disparity is enormous, 2 and
of alcohol, where nine-tenths of the users have no difficulty with the drug,6
but even with respect to heroin. 64 Similarly, the vast majority of gun owners
are non-criminal, and their guns create no social problems.6 5 It is true that the
gun which created no problem at all this year may, next year, kill in an
accident or in a crime of passion, or be sold or stolen and thereafter used in a
robbery.66 Even so, when one considers that there are over 100 million guns in
private possession,6 7 it seems clear that on a per gun basis, the vast majority of
guns in private hands will impose no costs at all upon society.
Still another lesson we have learned from our experience with prohibiting
drugs is that prohibitions are differentially effective with respect to different
kinds of users. Typically, they are most effective with respect to the users
about which we are least worried. For instance, the laws against marijuana are
most effective in denying access to the drug to middle-class citizens of middle-
age or above. They are far less successful, indeed almost completely
unsuccessful, with respect to the high school students, the unstable, and the
marginally adjusted - those who are far more likly to cause social harm
through their use of the drug.68
With respect to guns, it is likely that the reduction in gun possession would
not produce a proportionate decrease in the social harm caused by guns. It is,
of course, a considerable exaggeration to say that "When guns are outlawed,
only outlaws will have guns" if by this one means that only those involved in
61 MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 23.
62 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 311-54.
6 ALcOHOL, supra note 7, at 11.
64 L. G. Hunt, Relationship of Heroin Supply to Increases in Use and Other Epidemiological
Observations on the Effects of Liberalizing the Heroin Laws (May, 1978) (Center for Planning
and Research, Inc.).
65 See note 11 supra.
66 P. J. Cook, A Preliminary Report on the Demand for Guns in Robbery (Oct. 5, 1976)
(unpublished paper; on file with J. Kaplan at Stanford University).
67 G. NEWTON & F. E. ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 4.
66 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 23-26, 166-67; Abelson, supra note 37.
1979]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
property and violent crimes would be gun owners. There would, of course, be
many others who illegally kept their guns and would not otherwise act in any
criminal manner. Nonetheless, we would expect that individuals who already
risk more serious criminal sanctions for committing crimes with their guns
would be among those least affected by a gun prohibition.
The more interesting and important question involves the basically law-
abiding individuals who would otherwise use their guns in crimes of passion.
To the extent that they give up their guns because of the law, their homicide
rate presumably will be lowered. However, not only are we unable to predict
the overall rate of non-compliance with a gun prohibition law by otherwise
law-abiding citizens, we are also unable to tell whether those who would use
their guns in a crime of passion are less likely to obey a prohibition than the
average non-criminal gun owner. It is hard to think of any reason why those
individuals who would commit crimes of passion with their guns would be
likely to obey the prohibition. And if, as seems likely, those who commit the
crimes of passion are less law-abiding than the rest of non-criminal gun
owners, they might be less likely to obey the gun prohibition law as well.
Another problem faced in the drug area can be expected to decrease
further the benefits we might anticipate from obedience to a gun prohibition.
Any calculation of the social cost of drug use must reckon with the fact that at
least some portion of this damage would be accomplished in another way if
the drug in question ceased to exist. We simply do not know how many heroin
addicts would be alcoholics if no more heroin were available to them, how
many alcoholics would be psychotics if they could not escape into alcoholism,
or how many marijuana users would use a more dangerous drug if marijuana
disappeared. The chances are that in all these cases, the number would be
significant. 9
The same argument is applicable to the case of guns. But here,
remarkably, we can make a better guess as to the savings in human life if no
guns were in private hands. Zimring's classic study reveals that an attempt to
kill is about four times as likely to end fatally if a gun is used rather than a
knife.70 Presumably, then, we should lower somewhat our estimate of the
maximum number of lives which might be saved by a gun prohibition of any
given degree of effectiveness. Because of the lessened availability of guns, the
saving in life should be in the neighborhood of eighty percent due to a
decrease in deaths resulting from crimes of passion and accidental shootings.
The effect of a gun prohibition on suicides, which account for over half of
firearm deaths, is not clear. It is likely, of course, that some who would
otherwise commit suicide with a gun would think better of self-destruction if
that instrumentality were not easily available to them. On the other hand, we
simply do not know enough to make an educated guess as to what percentage
of gun suicide victims would have persevered and used some presumably
more diffiult or less satisfactory means of self-destruction if they did not have
a gun at hand.
Finally, though presumably it would be much more effective with respect
69 Maddux & Elliot, Problem Drinkers Among Patients on Methadone, 2 AM. J. DRuG &
ALCOHOL ABUSE 245, 250-52 (1975).
70 Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 721 (1968).
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to law-abiding citizens, a gun prohibition would probably not be completely
ineffective even in lowering the availability of guns to robbers. To the extent it
was successful, the effect of the prohibition would be quite complex.
Presumably, it would cause some robberies that would otherwise be
committed with guns to be committed without them, thus saving the lives of
about eighty percent of those who would have been the victims of the
attendant homicides.
One major consequence of a robber's possession of a gun is that it allows
him to attack better defended and more lucrative targets, such as commercial
establishments, rather than more vulnerable elderly persons.71 Rather
elementary economic reasoning would predict that a lessened availability of
firearms to robbers would not only lower the number of gun robberies but
also displace some robberies from less to more vulnerable targets.7" Since a
robbery with a gun results in a somewhat greater percentage of deaths while a
robbery without a firearm results in a higher likelihood of serious injuries, a
lessened availability of guns to robbers might lower the number of deaths but
increase the number of serious injuries. Moreover, a lessened availability of
guns might increase the total number of robberies since some robbers might
have to increase their activity to maintain a constant income from less
lucrative targets .73
Of course, we would hope that a lowered availability of guns to robbers
would reduce the number of robberies and hence the total number of
injuries. We would expect that the lessened availability of guns to robbers
would lower the robbery rate significantly.74 After all, a gun does make it
appear easier and safer for a robber and allows even the physically weak or
the very young to rob strangers.
Finally, in thinking about the benefits of gun prohibition in reducing the
toll taken by firearms, we should also consider whether there are any societal
benefits in gun possession which might be decreased as well. Even though we
may not regard as worthwhile the uses of guns in hunting and sports or the
feeling of security that gun ownership may create, we should not neglect the
possibility that widespread private ownership of firearms may in fact deter
some burglaries and robberies. It has been calculated that a burglar is about
one-tenth as likely to be shot by his victim as he is to be sent to prison,7 5 and the
figure may be even higher for the armed robber. Neither event is, of course, a
very likely one, but it is hard to believe, considering the magnitude of the two
sanctions, that the threat of private violence is an insignificant deterrent to the
would-be burglar or robber.
Since the crucial determinant of the balance of costs and benefits in any
prohibition law is the extent of violation, a matter which is very difficult to
predict, one can only speculate upon the result of a gun prohibition. We do not
now have any such prohibition, and it is impossible to prove any hypothetical
"' See P. J. Cook, supra note 59. See also W. G. Skogan, Weapon Use in Robbery, in VIOLENTr
CRnE (J. Inciardi & A Pottieger eds. 1978).
712 W. G. Skogan, supra note 71, at 67-68.
7' See Kates, Reflections on the Relevancy of Gun Control, 13 CRim. L. BULL. 122 (1977); P. J.
Cook, supra note 59; W. G. Skogan, supra note 71.
71 P. J. Cook, supra note 59; W. G. Skogan, supra note 71.
75 See, e.g., NAT'L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUNDATION, INc., supra note 11; P. J. Cook, supra note59.
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statement true or false. Nonetheless, insofar as we can guess, the better
speculation would be that the magnitude of violations would be such that the
costs of attempting to enforce a gun prohibition would clearly outweigh the
benefits we might achieve from a lowered availability of firearms.
Such a conclusion, of course, does not resolve the issue of gun control. We
can apply yet another lesson we have learned from our experience with drugs.
In determining our drug control policy, we have long known that drugs need
not all stand or fall together. Putting the most rational face possible on our
decisions, we have attempted to pick out and criminalize what we consider to
be the most dangerous drugs, with the exceptions of alcohol and tobacco,
which, though dangerous, are also so widely used that their prohibition would
impose intolerable costs on the society. However, even though we cannot
criminalize a drug because the costs imposed by wholesale violations of the
law would be too great, we nonetheless may criminalize its most dangerous
and abusable forms or attempt to lessen its availability differentially to the
specific groups whose use of the drug will impose the greatest social costs on
US.
In these ways, we may hope to influence consumption while bearing far
lesser costs than would be imposed by a more complete criminalization. Thus,
even though we have legalized alcohol after a brief experiment with
Prohibition, the highest proof and presumably most abusable forms of the
drug are still often criminalized.76 Moreover, though alcohol is for the most
part freely available, it is often legally withheld from a limited class of people
- minors and, in some states, alcoholics.
Of course, we have long applied just this kind of reasoning to guns and
different kinds of guns have already been subjected to differing regulations.
Machine guns and sawed-off shotguns are prohibited; sales of handguns are
legally restricted, though in a somewhat half-hearted way; and long guns are
subject to even less regulation. As a result, it may be argued that even if the
criminalization of all firearms would impose costs which would outweigh its
benefits, the balance might tilt the other way with respect to a more specific
category of guns. Of course, the type that first comes to mind is the handgun.
After all, there are far fewer handguns than long guns in private hands, and on
a per gun basis handguns are far more dangerous, accounting for about eighty
percent of the gun homicides. 77
Though a prohibition of handguns would have many aspects in common
with the more general prohibition of all guns, the lesser number of weapons
involved and the greater social cost per weapon would lead us to expect that,
all other things being equal, it would achieve a better balance of costs and
benefits. Despite this, there are still a great many handgun owners who, should
they be resistant to complying with the prohibition, would impose on us many
of the costs we have previously discussed. We cannot tell, of course, whether
handgun owners as a class will be more or less resistant to a prohibition than
other gun owners. There are reasons, however, to expect some differences.
While the owners of long guns primarily give hunting and sport as their
reasons for gun ownership, the most common reason given by handgun
76 Kaplan, Heroin, supra note 2.
17 G. NEWrON & F. E. ZINImING, supra note 20, at 49.
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owners is self-protection. One would think that this kind of elemental
justification, whether valid or not, would be the hardest to override through
the threat of legal punishment. Nonetheless, it may be that the much greater
danger to the owner and his family inherent in handguns makes the owners
more ambivalent about their possession. It is interesting, as well, that while the
long gun has deep cultural roots in America, the widespread possession of
handguns is a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, in 1964, less than 750,000
new handguns were purchased in this country. The number had doubled by
1967 and increased more than three-fold in 1968.78
It can be argued that if the handgun prohibition is partially effective, the
law might lower the perceived need to own firearms for self-defense. This in
turn might increase obedience to the prohibition and become part of a
circular process which feeds upon itself to make the prohibition more and
more effective. The problem is that most handgun owners do not see their
weapons as necessary to protect them from others with handguns. Rather,
thcy see their weapons as protection from unarmed but younger or stronger
intruders. On the other hand, if handgun owners really do keep their guns for
protection, they can perhaps be talked out of the idea. So far as we can tell,
handguns are not much good for defense since they are much more likely to
injure the owner and his family than to protect them.
Again, the major unknown in computing the likely costs and benefits of a
handgun prohibition is the extent of cooperation by the citizenry. An
experimental buy-back program in Baltimore offered fifty dollars per
operable handgun, which was considerably above the average cost of those
weapons. The program managed to recover only 8,400 handguns in a period
of almost a year. This figure was estimated to represent about one-fourth of
the handguns in the city.79 The relatively high price offered for the weapons,
as compared to the cost of replacing them, may well have induced people
simply to replace their old guns with better weapons at government expense.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the second quarter of the
handguns would be as easy to remove from circulation as the first - or the
third as the second.
The difficulty and uncertainty of enforcing satisfactorily a prohibition of
all handguns has moved various commentators to suggest the enactment of a
law which merely requires their registration. Although such a law, according
to the polls, has the support of a solid majority of American people,80 its
advantages are by no means obvious. Indeed, it would seem that without
more, such a gun registration law is likely to result in a worse balance of costs
and benefits than would a law prohibiting all handgun possession.
Before we can evaluate the costs or benefits of a handgun registration
scheme, we must appreciate the fact that the term registration encompasses
many different arrangements. 8' A registration arrangement can be as simple as
automobile registration, where the gun owner merely would have to file a
declaration containing his name and address, the kind of gun he owns, and its
78 Id. at 174.
'9 Baltimore News American, Oct. 19, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
10 See Harris, supra note 43.
1 MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 22-43; F. E. Zimring, supra note 55.
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serial number. Registration, however, can be more complex; it can involve the
owner's birth certificate, photograph, and perhaps his fingerprints. A gun
registration system could be designed which would be analogous to the driver
licensing system. Such a system could require safety instruction, proficiency
exams, and even psychological testing.
All of the above licensing and registration requirements are of the
permissive category which, upon certain formalities, allows a registered
weapon to be possessed by anyone except people in a relatively small
proscriLed category. A licensing or registration system, however, could also
be of the restrictive variety. Either some particular objective reason, such as
employment as a security guard, or the approval of the police would be
required before an individual could purchase or possess a handgun. Needless
to say, each of these means of registration would have its own costs and, as the
registration became more complex, would become increasingly expensive for
the government to administer and for the citizen to obey.
Even if we used the simplest system, that one analogous to auto
registration, we should not anticipate the same ease of administration for gun
registration. Automobile registration is easily enforced by the issuance of
license plates which are visible to all on the highway; possession of an
unregistered gun is private and would require us to enforce the registration
law in the same way as a prohibition against gun ownership. And we must
remember that no one fears that his automobile registration will be a prelude
to the confiscation of his car. With respect to guns, however, the perception of
many owners is quite different.8
2
In any event, if many handgun owners did not register their weapons
because of lethargy, fear, principle, parsimony, or ignorance, a gun
registration system might become very costly. Proportional to their numbers,
the unregistered owners would impose upon us many of the same costs which
would stem from a complete prohibition of guns.
The real problem with a law simply requiring the registration of handguns
is that it would provide few benefits to balance its costs,83 except in
combination with another type of law, which we will discuss shortly. A
registration system that is not burdensome will not lower gun possession to
any significant extent; indeed, it would not even be intended to do so. Those
who possessed guns legally could register them with no trouble. If owners
wished to avoid registration, one would expect that they would simply keep
their guns without registering them. Those who possessed handguns for
criminal purposes would probably not be influenced by any requirement of
registration. Moreover, as registration becomes more burdensome, it takes on
more of the characteristics of a prohibition - though probably at higher
administrative cost.
Many people seem to feel that a major advantage of a registration system is
that it would make it easier under some circumstances for the police to
identify a firearm and trace it to its owner. There are several problems with
this view. As far as the basically law-abiding owner is concerned, his gun
82 R. KuKLA, supra note 11; NAT'L SHOOTING SPoRTs FouNDATION, INC., supra note 11.
83 Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,4 J. LEGAL STuDrEs 150
(1975); F. E. Zimring, supra note 55; M. Borish, Gun Registration (June 1,1977) (student paper,
Stanford Law School "Criminology Seminar").
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crime is most likely to be the shooting of a relative or acquaintance in the heat
of passion. In these cases, the police usually find both the gun and its owner
quite easily. With respect to the criminal gun owner, the problem is far more
difficult, but a registration system is not of much help. First, automobiles are
sufficiently large that they can be and are built with a number of serial
numbers in secret locations. The same cannot be done with handguns, and it is
not difficult to remove the serial numbers on weapons. Secondly, guns whose
possessors are unknown and which can be connected to a crime seldom fall
into police hands. If weapons could be more easily traced, they would
presumably be hidden or destroyed and would fall into police hands even less
often. Finally, competent criminals would exert considerable efforts to obtain
firearms which could not be traced to their crimes.
Of course, it would be helpful in tracking down criminals to have a registry
of the bullets fired by each gun, since police do find bullets they cannot trace
- often in homicide and robbery victims. The problem is that any method of
registering guns by the particular markings on the bullets they fire would be
hopelessly impractical. The markings change with the age of the gun and, in
any event, we have no method of indexing the markings in the way we do
fingerprints. Hence, we would have no means of finding the few relevant
patterns among the vast number which would be registered.
Instead of attempting to deal with the huge reservoir of guns or even only
of handguns, a more cost-effective means of gun control might be the
application of what is called the vice model,s 4 which forbids the sale of
firearms. The major advantage of such a law would be the avoidance of the
large social costs inherent in turning millions of otherwise law-abiding citizens
into criminals. At the same time, an effective prohibition on sale would, over
time, gradually reduce the number of guns in private possession.
At first glance, criminalizing the selling of guns might appear logically
inconsistent with our failing to punish the buying as well. In fact, this is not the
case. In drafting laws, we often draw the line between legal and. illegal
conduct so that the maximum reduction in the proscribed behavior can be
gained at minimum social cost. 5 A frequent result is that laws aimed solely at
suppressing sales are more cost-effective in reducing the possession and use of
a substance than are laws which attempt to suppress possession directly.
There are several reasons for this result. First, there are fewer sellers than
buyers; this would permit a concentration of law enforcement efforts where
they would do the most good. Second, juries are likely to be more sympathetic
to a "mere" user, who may be ill-advised, than to a businessman making a
profit from the weaknesses of others. States which have decriminalized small-
scale marijuana possession and other "non-victim" crimes have relied on this
technique. Offenses treated under the vice model range from gambling,
where the person who takes illegal bets is guilty of a crime while the person
who places them is not, to the offense of selling new automobiles not equipped
with seat belts, where the seller, rather than the buyer, is guilty of an offense.
Although it is true that a simple prohibition on sales or transfers of guns
would probably be more efficient than a broader prohibition which also
14 J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA, supra note 2, at 315-30.
85 Id. at 132.
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forbade their use or possession, even prohibitions on sales will be ineffective if
the demand for the product and the resistance to the law are too great. We
must remember that Prohibition itself never criminalized the possession or
use of alcohol; Prohibition merely forbade the manufacture and sale of
alcohol. As a result, we will examine a prohibition upon the sale of guns as if it
encompassed only handguns, on the theory that the same factors that would
make a complete prohibition on handguns more cost-effective than one on all
guns would also apply to application of the vice model.
Here, however, we encounter an important difference between guns and
drugs, one which makes the criminalization of gun sales less effective. In
theory, drugs could be handled to the complete satisfaction of the
prohibitionist simply (or not so simply) by cutting off the sources of supply.
After all, the average user of any of the illegal drugs rarely has on hand more
than enough to tide him over a few weeks. Guns, however, are not perishable,
consumable items. A gun in private possession is presumably dangerous for its
entire useful life, a period not only of years but of decades. As a result, the
enormous reservoir of firearms in private possession will greatly lower the
effect of even an enforceable prohibition on handgun sales in reducing the
social cost of the use of such weapons.
The best analogy to drugs would be prohibiting the sale of ammunition,
which is moderately perishable, rather than the sale of guns.8 The problem
here, however, is technical in nature. First, handgun ammunition is basically
the same as long gun ammunition so any attempt to control handguns by this
method would involve the more difficult, costly and stubborn problem of long
gun regulation as well.87 Secondly, serviceable ammunition is simpler to make
than any of the illegal drugs being manufactured in the laboratories all over
the United States. The difficulty of manufacturing ammunition lies somewhat
closer to distilling liquor than to making PCP or amphetamines. In other
words, the likelihood is that by forbidding the sale or manufacture of handgun
ammunition, we would be adding yet another major substance-abuse
problem to our already crowded inventory.
To examine further the effect of a sales prohibition on the social cost of
handgun ownership, we must look more carefully at two kinds of handgun
owners: the basically law-abiding owner and the criminal who acquires his
gun with the intention of using it in illegal activity. The law-abiding owner,
even though he may not be willing to give up or register his handgun, may
draw the line at acquiring one illegally. Moreover, it is quite possible that he
will not know an illegal seller and will be unwilling to go to the trouble of
finding one. The criminal gun-owner, on the other hand, presumably will have
a greater incentive to obtain a handgun and will be more likely to know an
illegal seller.
It is difficult to speculate on what an illegal handgun supply industry would
look like if sales were forbidden. It is by no means clear that it would look like
our illegal drug industry since the demand, and hence the economies of scale,
would seem to be far greater in the case of drugs than guns. The non-criminal
handgun buyer would presumably be a one-time purchaser. Even if the
86 MEMORANDUM, supra note 12, at 28.
s7 Id. at 29 n.40.
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robber had to dispose of his weapon more often, illegal sellers would
probably lack the repeat business that characterizes a drug connection.
That is not to say that an illegal market would not spring up to serve the
law-abiding handgun owner. Even without the economies of scale or the
repeat business of the illegal drug industry, enough people living on the
fringes of legality might accommodate acquaintances and provide large
numbers of guns to non-criminal users. We can, of course, predict that a
prohibition on gun sales would raise the price of guns since the seller will
demand additional profit to compensate him for his risk of detection.
We cannot tell at this point how common handgun purchases would be
under such conditions. This depends on two factors: 1) whether large num-
bers of potential purchasers see their need for handgun protection as great
enough to justify purchasing from illegal sellers and 2) whether an illegal
market can operate under the constraints of whatever law enforcement can be
brought to bear on the situation.
So far as the latter is concerned, our experience with drugs indicates that, if
the demand exists, there will be many who, despite the efforts of law
enforcement, will step in to supply the need. If Al Capone could rationalize
his bootlegging empire, he might say:
I'm a businessman. I've made my money by supplying a popular
demand. If I break the law my customers are as guilty as I am. When
I sell liquor it's bootlegging. When my patrons serve it on silver trays
on Lake Shore Drive it's hospitality. The country wanted booze and
I've organized it. Why should I be called a public enemy?88
There will be many who can justify selling guns to respectable people even if
such sale is illegal. Moreover, if they cannot justify it satisfactorily, experience
indicates that they will do it anyway.
Nor is it clear that salesmen would be unable to find the guns to sell. Even if
the illegal gun market would not in itself support many full-time criminals,
illegal wholesaling and smuggling might be quite profitable activities. We
must remember that marijuana, which at least on a per volume basis is less
valuable than handguns, is quite profitably smuggled into the United States in
enormous quantities. At the retail level, we cannot even predict how many
people would seek to accommodate friends and earn a small profit by selling
handguns illegally.
There are several serious costs to any partially successful effort to stop the
sale of handguns. Though on a smaller scale, many of these drawbacks
parallel the costs of attempting to prevent handgun ownership directly. The
chances are that there will be a considerable number of illegal handgun sales,
including sales by those who are in the business of handgun supply and sales
by handgun owners who wish to sell their guns rather than give them away or
destroy them. It is very likely that an attempt to interdict what may be a
considerable demand for guns will consume a good deal of investigatory time
and prosecutorial and judicial resources, although this would not be as
expensive as attempting to administer sanctions directed at the user himself.
If the citizenry would be sympathetic to such prosecutions, enforcement
" A. SINcLAm, PROHmBrrION, ERA oF ExcEss 220 (1964).
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expenses might be worthwhile. Unfortunately, however, it is possible that
once we have made the sale of all handguns illegal, those who sell them will
appear to some otherwise law-abiding citizens as Robin Hoods, violating the
unpopular laws for the greater good. It does not take a very significant
minority of the population to deadlock juries and cause the legal system a
considerable amount of difficulty and expense.
The means that the police would have to use to enforce such laws are
already familiar to us because of their use in the drug area.8" Preventing a sale
between a willing buyer and a willing seller requires intrusive techniques.
Indeed, even to inadequately enforce such laws the police must use
informants, undercover agents, methods which border on entrapment,
searches and seizures, wiretapping, and a whole panoply of enforcement
techniques which not only often transcend the borders of constitutionality but
which, even where they are legally permissible, tend to bring the police into
disrepute. Use of such means against relatively small numbers of serious
criminals may be worth this kind of cost. However, where the police are asked
to enforce laws by such methods against large numbers of people who have
public support, the consequences can be more serious.
Probably the most serious difficulty with criminalizing the entire market
for handguns is that it may force us to make choices between control over the
supply of guns to the large number of non-criminal users, a small percentage
of whom nonetheless in the heat of a passion will use them to kill, and control
over the supply of guns to the much lower number of criminal gun users who
are more likely to use their guns in robberies and in a significant number of
related homicides. To understand this potential problem, let us examine an
alternative policy - a complete firearms prohibition applicable only to those
whom we think are especially likely to use guns in criminal ventures.
It should first be noted that such a policy would eliminate any attempt to
use the criminal law to keep handguns from the law-abiding. In a sense, then,
we would accept the some 10,000 deaths arising out of the use of handguns in
crimes of passion9" as we have accepted the 50,000 deaths a year due to
automobile accidents. 91 We would then concentrate our resources on keeping
guns away from criminals, particularly from those who commit some 400,000
robberies .92
In a way, this is a more difficult task since on a per person basis it is harder
to affect the gun market for criminals. Guns can be diverted from the
legitimate market serving the majority of legal gun buyers, stolen from the
large reservoir of non-criminal guns, or clandestinely manufactured or
smuggled in from abroad. Nonetheless, despite the obvious obstacles, it may
be that some reduction can be achieved in the availability of guns to criminals.
If so, this is an area where any reduction might be both noticeable and
welcome. The argument, then, is that even though criminals are much more
likely than law-abiding citizens to have access to illegal sellers of guns, not all
89 M. MooRE, BUY AND BusT: THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF AN ILLICIT MARKET IN HEROIN
(1977); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974).
90 F.B.I. 1974, supra note 13, at 19.
91 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIsTICAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES 78 (1978).
92 F.B.I. 1977, supra note 13, at 17.
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of those who commit gun robberies are that well connected. It might be that
the law could make obtaining a gun so expensive, time-consuming, and risky
that many would-be criminals would not make an attempt. A great many
episodic criminals take relatively little trouble to plan or prepare for their
crimes. With respect to these, our law might accomplish something by
diverting them to less dangerous activities or encouraging them to give up the
idea of committing crimes.
If we began to direct our law enforcement efforts toward making guns less
available to criminals, we could take advantage of their relatively small
numbers compared to the rest of the gun-owning population and of the fact
that they would lack significant public support for their gun possession. As a
result, we may attempt not only to prohibit the sale of handguns to them but to
restrict long guns as well, a move that would probably be impractical if
extended to the entire population. This is, in fact, quite important since it is
likely that with little effort, long guns could be cut down into handguns
serviceable for criminal purposes.9 3 Moreover, the much smaller number of
individuals subject to the criminal law would allow us to criminalize their
possession as well as their purchase of firearms.
The basic problem in designing such a law is that to make realistic
predictions as to its effect in various circumstances would require more
knowledge about the categories of individuals who should not have access to
firearms and about the likely shape of the illegal market that may attempt to
serve them. Since we are denied perfect predictive ability, we cannot simply
attempt to deny firearms to those who are going to use them in robberies. The
first question, then, is, how can we operationally define the group of
individuals to whom we wish to deny firearms so as to maximize the excess of
benefits over costs in our effort? It would seem that those already convicted of
a crime should be our first target. Though it could be argued that we should
base our standard on arrest rather than conviction, there is a strong reluctance
to make any disabilities dependent on anything so unsupervised and
discretionary as police arrest powers. Moreover, conviction of a crime is
already too broad a disability. Even though we have found that criminals are
often unspecialized and that robbers exhibit considerable versatility, we
could probably use a more precise predictor of robbery than conviction of
any crime. Perhaps conviction of a misdemeanor involving assault or of any
felony would be a start. And we might also wish to have a statute of limitations
restricting the disability to perhaps ten years from the conviction or release
from imprisonment.
Probably more important is the second major category of individuals we
would like to keep away from guns - juveniles. There are several reasons for
this. First, we have a tradition of attempting to deny youth access to
dangerous activities, ranging from automobile driving to alcohol consump-
tion. Second, juveniles represent an especially crime-prone group; the
average age for burglary arrests is sixteen, for robbery and rape, eighteen, and
for murder, twenty.9 4 Finally, we regard a juvenile as having less of a
9 Kates, supra note 73, at 122.
4 F.B.I. 1975, supra note 13, at 196-97.
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legitimate need for a handgun to protect his home and family. Hence, the law
would have considerable public support.
It might be, too, that the law should discriminate in this regard between
rural and urban youths. In rural areas, gun ownership is a different kind of
tradition, and the range of legal uses for guns is significantly greater than in our
cities. It might be that similar rules should apply to all juveniles so far as
handguns are concerned, but that juveniles living outside urban areas should
be allowed greater latitude with respect to long guns.
Once we have defined the prohibited classes, which presumably would
also include the mentally ill, alcoholics and drug addicts, we still would have
to face the issue of enforcement. It is one thing to designate specific classes as
unable to possess or purchase guns; it is quite another thing to prevent their
purchases. Presumably, there would be several ways for disqualified
individuals to purchase firearms. First, they might purchase from legitimate
gun retailers, Sellers might sell guns to members of a prohibited class either
because they don't realize their disqualifications or because the sellers wished
the extra profit from illegal sales. Second, some purchases may be made in a
completely illegal market, typically in stolen guns but perhaps also in
smuggled or even illegally manufactured weapons. Finally, those disqualified
from gun ownership might be able to purchase guns from the large number of
legal owners.
Nonetheless, our experience with alcohol and various abusable prescrip-
tion drugs indicates that the law can make it more difficult for members of
prohibited classes to obtain such substances from legitimate dealers. Indeed,
with respect to the medical drugs, most of the supply for users who lack legal
prescriptions is purchased not from pharmacists but from illegal sellers in a
completely illegal retail market. Since gun sales, especially to members of the
groups denied the right to purchase such weapons, would probably be
regarded as a considerably more serious matter than alcohol or drug sales, the
law might be more effective in this area.
A major determinant of the effectiveness of any effort to restrict the access
of prohibited classes to firearms would be the amount of trouble we were
willing to require that legitimate gun dealers undertake to restrict sales to
eligible buyers. We can require them to check identification to make it less
likely that they will sell to juveniles. It is much more difficult to require them
not to sell to those with criminal convictions. The problem there is that we
have no central registry of records of convictions since the famous FBI "rap
sheets" are much more complete with respect to arrests. Setting up such a
registry might be a worthwhile investment of resources, but there would be
additional implications as to rights of privacy. Finally, the definitions we use
are so inherently ambiguous that preventing sales to alcoholics, drug addicts,
or the mentally ill might be so difficult as not to be worth much effort.
It is likely that the imposition of a short waiting period between gun
purchase and delivery might have several major advantages. However, we
must balance these benefits against the inconvenience to the large number of
legitimate purchasers and realize that the more burdensome the re-
quirements, the higher the number of those who, at any given level of
enforcement, will not comply. Despite this potential effect, a waiting period
for checking the eligibility of the purchaser would not only screen out some
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illegal purchasers but, when combined with penalties for false statements of
eligibility or identity, might deter significant numbers of other ineligible
purchasers from any attempts by raising considerably their risk of
apprehension. In addition, such a waiting period might have another benefit
which is unrelated to enforcing the laws against prohibited sales. By
increasing the difficulty of purchasing a gun for those not in a prohibited
category, the waiting period might lower the number of guns purchased on
impulse or in the heat of passion, thereby preventing the sales of those guns
most likely to be used in homicides.
The illegal market for guns is obviously a very serious law enforcement
problem and is different in many ways from the effort to enforce requirements
upon legal dealers. Since it involves an effort to suppress a consensual traffic, it
raises problems similar to those encountered in attempting to suppress the
traffic in stolen goods, "hard" drugs, illegal loans, commercial sex and murder
for hire. Nonetheless, in all of these cases we have a feeling that the law has
some worthwhile effect, often a considerable one as compared with no law at
all, and that in most of them the effort is worth its costs. Here, where the
number of law violators would be small compared to that which we would
expect if we criminalized firearm sales to a large percentage of the citizenry,
the drain on law enforcement resources would not be as great. Insofar as we
would be attempting to deny firearms to what would seem to be an especially
dangerous group, we would be using these resources in a worthy cause.
Although law enforcement could not be expected to suppress this traffic
completely, one would expect it to be able to shrink the illegal market
sufficiently so that at least some would-be purchasers would have a good deal
of difficulty finding illegal sellers or convincing them that they could be
trusted enough to be allowed to purchase illegal weapons.
The final major source of guns to the prohibited classes would be sales in a
second-hand market by those who have purchased guns legitimately. This
source of firearms can be divided into two classes. First, we would worry
about the legal purchaser acting solely as a front or conduit and acquiring the
weapon on behalf of someone he knows is prohibited from purchasing
firearms. Although this would involve a violation of the conspiracy laws, it
would be difficult to prevent. Perhaps most purchasers would be concerned
that a gun they had purchased turned up soon thereafter in the hands of an
illegal possessor, especially when the possessor might have reason to tell the
police precisely how he acquired the gun.
This problem can be partially solved by regarding it as a facet of
controlling sales by legitimate gun dealers. The waiting period on purchases
from legitimate dealers might effectively make it more difficult and less
profitable for the legal buyer to act as a front for members of the proscribed
class, especially if this requirement is combined with a restriction on the
number of guns one individual could purchase in a given period.
The problem of resales by legitimate purchasers is even more worrisome.
The purchase of second-hand guns from owners who either were ignorant of
the buyer's membership in a prohibited class or who simply wanted to sell
their guns enough to do so to illegal purchasers might be a major cause of
leakage of guns.
Sales from the large reservoir of guns in private possession cause some of
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the most difficult problems in designing a system of firearms control. Placing
upon all private persons the same responsibilities of checking, delay, and
record-keeping that we would expect of gun dealers is likely to be
inpracticable except in the context of a gun registration scheme. If all guns
were registered to their owners, private sales would have to be entered in the
system. It would then become a great deal easier to prevent the transfer of
private weapons to prohibited classes. We have already seen, however, the
difficulties and costs of attempting to implement a universal registration
system for handguns. Because of the ease of cutting down long guns into
serviceable handguns, we probably would have to register long guns as well,
thus making the effort even more likely to be over-costly.
Fortunately, the great bulk of guns used for illegal purposes is not acquired
through purchase from private gun owners.95 Rather, guns used in crimes
seem either to be stolen guns or to have been purchased new. If it is indeed the
case that most criminals do not know non-criminal gun owners well enough to
purchase guns from them and that most law-abiding gun owners can be
trusted to avoid selling guns to juveniles, it may be unnecessary to incur all the
problems of a registration scheme in order to exert control over the resale
market.
It is now important to compare a prohibition on the sales of all handguns
with an effort to deny all guns to prohibited classes. It is true that the former
might be moderately effective in reducing handgun sales to non-criminal users
and, in the long run, even successful in lessening the number of handguns in
private possession. Moreover, the successful enforcement of such a law might
be helpful in lessening the availability of handguns to criminals, although it
would be especially hard to keep guns from the most dangerous individuals.
On the other hand, a law directed solely at narrowly drawn prohibited classes
would be far less costly to implement and might have significant beneficial
effects.
One might think that the proper course would be to combine the two kinds
of law, criminalizing all sales of handguns while making it illegal for members
of the prohibited classes to buy long guns or to possess any firearms. The
problem with this combination is that a general prohibition on handgun sales
might make it more difficult to enforce the law aimed specifically at the
criminal market. In other words, we may have to choose between the two
laws.
There are several reasons for this. First, it seems to be a general principle of
law enforcement that the larger the illegal market, the more difficult it is for
the law to exert control over any part of it. Partly this is because the more
rigorous the law against any sale, and the more transactions the law attempts
to prevent, the more enforcement resources we will need to require any given
level of compliance. Moreover, if past experience in the drug area is a guide,
the amount of resources made available would not increase proportionately
with the task. As a result, resources would tend to be diluted rather than
concentrated on the most important areas of firearms control. Second, as the
95 M. H. Moore, The Supply of Handguns: An Analysis of the Potential and Current
Importance of Alternative Sources of Handguns to Criminal Offenders (May, 1979) (unpublished
paper; on file with J. Kaplan at Stanford University).
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prohibitted class expands to include greater numbers of benign offenders,
illegal gun sellers will begin to benefit from an aura of respectability and will
come to courts already over-crowded with "gun cases." Finally, as large
numbers of illegal gun sellers are drawn into the market by the criminalization
of the presently legal sales, some will feel that they have much less to lose by
making other kinds of illegal sales as well.
Insofar as one of the most effective means of denying handguns to
criminals is requiring legitimate dealers to keep records and perform other
bureaucratic tasks, we should recognize that these tasks are far easier to
impose on legitimate businessmen than on illegal sellers. The more illegal
sellers we create with a partially-enforced prohibition on sales to otherwise
law-abiding citizens, the more sellers we free from bureaucratic requirements
and make available to sell to ineligible purchasers.
We have seen this precise result in the drug area. It has been argued that
marijuana would be easier to control in a context where the drug was available
to all adults than under present laws prohibiting all sales. In addition, it has
been pointed out that the illegal sale of more dangerous drugs has been
encouraged by the criminalization of marijuana: "[B]y making the sale of
marijuana illegal we have given a monopoly of a very popular product to drug
pushers. Because they will be severely punished if they are caught selling
marijuana, they have little to lose by selling more dangerous drugs as well."9
The issues in designing an optimal means of reducing the toll taken by
firearms in our society are even more complex than has been indicated. We
have yet to take full account of the fact that ours is a federal system and that
the possibilities of successful gun control may vary from place to place in the
nation. It would seem, indeed, that the need for firearms control is greatest in
our cities, while the resistance to such efforts is greatest in our rural areas. One,
response to this would be a federal law varying in its requirements from place
to place, depending on the population density. However, the political climate
throughout the nation is a function of far more than the population density,
and local customs might make a severe law unenforceable in large areas
despite any demographic characteristic indicating the contrary.
Perhaps a more satisfactory arrangement would be to use federal law to do
two quite different things. First, it would set minimum standards, such as a
prohibition on sale to specific classes, and implement controls on legal sellers.
Or, if further thought or research indicates that much of the foregoing is
unduly pessimistic, it would impose a prohibition on the sale of all handguns.
The second purpose of a federal law would be to prevent traffic within one
jurisdiction from undercutting the more stringent regulations of another. In
this task, it would make great sense to require a gun purchaser to give an
address with his identification and to prohibit sale to a resident of an area
which itself forbids the sale or possession of such a weapon. Again, a short
waiting period might discourage individual purchasers from travelling some
distance to obtain firearms declared illegal in their home areas, and rules
discouraging multiple gun purchases would make it more difficult for the
entrepreneur gun runner.
" Kaplan, Official Views on Marijuana, 179 SCIENCE 168 (1973).
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Such a system would allow local political conditions to determine, within
significant limits, local policy upon firearms control. Those states or localities
which feel that they can afford the costs of a complete gun prohibition may
enact one; those which feel that only handguns should be prohibited or wish to
require gun registration could act accordingly. It might be that with the
cooperation of the national authorities, differing areas could enforce varieties
of such laws at costs which would not exceed their benefits.
It cannot be overemphasized that the more precise the function the law is
expected to perform, the greater the problem encountered in its drafting. A
flat prohibition can be written in a few sentences, while a regulatory scheme
will go on for many pages, creating many opportunities for evasion and
exempting as many activities as possible in order to lower the costs of
enforcement. Such an activity requires full knowledge of the gun market, of
the legitimate interests of gun owners, of the technology of firearms and of the
various means of record-keeping and enforcement. Finally, and perhaps most
important in considering any law, we must know not only what it will cost for
what we are getting, but also how much we will have to spend. To say that
these problems have received insufficient public attention would be an
understatement.
No matter what public policy we choose, however, firearms will still take a
significant toll on our society for some time to come. Indeed, it may even be
that the coercion of the law will not be the only important factor in lowering
this toll. If a handgun at home is far more likely to injure its owner or his family
than to protect them, it might be that gradually more and more people can be
made to understand this.
The educational effect of the law, however, is a complex one. In some
situations, a prohibition can show that society is serious about a matter and
teach through the example of the law. Where the law cannot be sufficiently
enforced and violations become widespread and open, the existence of the
law may do harm to proper education. In this case, what might be offered as
dispassionate factual material may be viewed as merely another effort to
enforce an unenforceable law. When education is seen as the handmaiden of
the law, it becomes far less persuasive.
Moreover, education might even be successful at lowering the toll taken
by guns without lowering the number actually possessed. In many areas of
drug control, we are forced to decide whether it is better to teach people not
to use a drug or to teach them to use it prudently. It might be that efforts to
teach gun safety to those who own guns might be a wise course, even if we
believe that the best kind of gun safety would be not to own the gun to begin
with.
On the other hand, if the law's reach does not too far exceed its grasp, a
major effect of an enforceable law which achieved widespread public
support would be gradually to help create a climate where gun possession is
less respectable and where those who have guns for protection will talk less
about them and be a little ashamed of their behavior. Not only might this
lower the costs imposed upon us by firearms but, over time, it might make
possible gradual improvements in the kinds of law we could adopt to do more
good than harm in this difficult area.
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